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          HE  Confession of 1967 in the United Presbyterian Church 
     marks the official end of the four-century Presbyterian venture 
into covenant theology.  Now past that milestone, perhaps we 
have reached a vantage point where we can turn dispassion- 
ately to survey that curious but historic route. Seen from its 
concept of responsible man, we here argue, that route has been 
a prolonged detour away from the insights of the Reformers. 
The Westminster Confession remains, of course, the prime con- 
fessional document of Presbyterians outside the United Church, 
for instance in the Scots and British parent churches, or with 
southern cousins in the Presbyterian Church, U.S.  Even in the 
United Church, the Westminster Confession remains in the show- 
room  of creeds.  But  we have recently  seen a breach  in the 
federal scheme so long embraced in Presbyterian confessional 
statements,  a breach  that  marks  the scheme where it yet re- 
mains  officially  as  a  theological  anachronism  no longer  re- 
garded seriously but  to be suffered  as historical background. 
With  the  hold  of federal  theology  officially  broken,  we can 
challenge  afresh  the  assumption  that  the  Calvinism  of  the 
Westminster Confession is true to the Reformer himself. Indeed, 
it has seldom been realised by those reared in the Reformed 
tradition  that the two covenant concept which  dominates the 
organisational substructure of all later Reformed  dogmatics is 
totally absent from Calvin.  More seriously, its fundamental in- 
compatibility with Calvin’s thought has gone all but unnoticed. 
   In the two generations  after  the death of Calvin  there ap- 
peared several variations of a theological format involving dual 
covenants, a format which matured in the contrasting ‘covenant 
of works’ and ‘covenant of grace’ of the Westminster Confession. 
So marked  a characteristic  did  this become  that  the central 
stream  of the  Reformed  faith  took  its name  from  the  Latin 
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The precise historical origin of the twin covenant idea is an 
interesting and as yet somewhat incompleted study in the now 
relatively obscure theologians who followed Calvin. We here 
can but outline its post-Reformation  origin. 
The notion  seems to have entered with  the Loci Communes 
( 1560) of Wolfgang Musculus ( 1497-1563), who in contrast with 
his fellow Reformers, divides the one covenant into two, a 
‘general covenant’ of God with the universe and a ‘special 
covenant’ of God with the elect.1 A little afterward the division 
of a ‘covenant of nature’ and a ‘covenant of grace’ was in- 
troduced by Zacharias Ursinus (1534-83), an author of the 
powerful Heidelberg Catechism. Fōederaltheologie was taught in 
systematic form in the Dutch universities of the seventeenth 
century by a notable sequence: Johann Koch or (in Latin) 
Cocceius (1603-69) ; his pupil Francis Burmann (1628-79) ; and. 
Burmann’s successor, Herman Witsius (1636-1708).2 Covenant 
theology was established in the Swiss church even earlier than 
in the Dutch, and later taught just as ably. Amandus Polanus 
(1561-1610) precedes Cocceius, J. H. Heidegger (1633-98) is 
his contemporary and friend; then federal theology reaches its 
full flower in Calvin’s own Genevan church in the teaching of 
Francis Turretin (1623-87), author of the long standard Re- 
formed text known as Turretin’s Institutes.3 
Covenant theology was once assumed to be continental in 
origin, and doubtless it has continental ancestry. But there is 
also evidence that as a true theological system it was born and 
reared on Scots and English soil. Robert Rollock (1555-99), 
first principal of the University of Edinburgh, wrote of 
‘God’s two covenants, both that of works and that of grace’, 
and in a 1597 Treatise on Effectual Calling is found the 
important term ‘covenant of works’, a term which earlier had 
seen little or no 
 
       1 Wolfgang Musculus, Loci Communes  Theologiae Sacrae (1560, 1564 and Basel, 
1599). 
     2 Zacharias Ursinus, Catechesis, Summa Theologiae in Opera Theologica (Heidel- 
berg, 1612), question 36, p. 15; Johannes Cocceius, Summa Doctrinae de Foedere et 
Testamento Dei (1648 and 1654), II, 1ff and IV, 1ff; Francis Burman, Synopsis 
Theologiae (Amsterdam, 1699); Herman Witsius, De  Oeconomia Foederum Dei cum 
hominibus (1677), often reprinted with wide circulation in  English  translation  by, 
William Crookshank, 1804, 1837.                                            
3  Amandus Polanus, Syntagma  Theologiae Christianae  (Hanover, 1625); J. H. 
Heidegger, Corpus Theologiae (Zurich, 1700); and Francis Turretin (Turrettinius), 
Institito Theologiae e1enctiae (1688), and often reprinted. The translations here of 
covenant writers are sometimes adapted from existing translations but more often 
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use.1 Also early and little noticed is the work of Dudly Fenner 
(1558?-87), a young English associate of Thomas Cartwright, 
who while exiled in Holland published his Sacra Theologia (1585) 
utilising a carefully worked out covenant of works set opposite 
a covenant of grace.2 
Whatever its precise origin, within a few decades the covenant 
scheme becomes something received generally by all. It is a 
characteristic of English  Puritanism,  seen, for instance, in 
Edward Fisher’s Marrow of  Modern Divinity ( 1645) or in William 
Ames, and in a variant form in John Ball.3    The scheme is given 
full confessional status for the first time in the Westminster Con- 
fession of Faith in  1647, although it had earlier appeared in the 
Irish  Articles,  and  in  this  form  it  thereafter  prevailed in Re- 
formed thought. Rooted so firmly in the confessional standards 
of the church, the scheme is repeated and elaborated by vir- 
tually all subsequent theologians who consider themselves 
disciples of Calvin. From these old world sources it appears in 
American Presbyterianism, taught at Princeton for over half a 
century by the nineteenth century’s most  esteemed American 
theologian, Charles Hodge (1797-1878).
4
 It was one of the 
prime requisites of sound orthodoxy. Where it was recognised 
that the concept was not in Calvin, this was considered a posi- 
tive development of his thought, even with occasional criticism 
of Calvin for not having adequately formulated the concept.6 
Despite the fact. that the first framers of covenant theology 
were soon forgotten men-partly because but few of their 
writings survived the transition from Latin to English, partly 
because Hodge and others who repeated substantially what 
they had said were nearer at hand-the system they founded 
long retained not merely wide prevalence in but control of the 
Presbyterian Churches. Through its confessional status and 
presence in the catechisms, it remained the official theology of 
                              1  Robert Rollock, Treatise on Effectual  Calling in Select  Works (Edinburgh, 1849), 
I, 25. 
2 See Leonard J. Trinterud, ‘The Origin of Puritanism’ in Church History, xx 
(March 1951), pp. 48ff. 
3  Edward Fisher,  The Marrow of Modern Divinity (1645), often  reprinted.  That 
 the work is Fisher’s has been disputed. William Ames, Medulla Theologica 
(Amster- 
 dam,  1623); John Ball,  Treatise on the Covenant of  Grace  (London,  1645). 
 5 Charles Hodge, S  ystematic  Theology (New York, 1877), II, 117ff. 
6 For instance: ‘Our own Calvin it is true fails to recall such a covenant (of 
works) in his eloquence.’–Melchior Leydecker of Utrecht, quoted in 
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all major Presbyterian bodies of both Britain and America until 
the recent adoption of the Confession of 1967. Even in churches 
adhering to the great mid-sixteenth-century Reformed con- 
fessions formed before the advent of covenant theology (Heidel- 
berg Catechism, Belgic Confession, Second Helvetic Confession), it is 
the orthodox theology. By way of English Puritanism  it  is 
widely dispersed in Baptist churches,  and not without con- 
siderable  influence  generally  in  the  Protestant  tradition. 
In the twentieth century, despite its official presence in the 
confessional standards, Reformed theology as characteristically 
preached came to give less and less formal allegiance to the 
doctrine of the covenants.  But the reason was never primarily 
a dissatisfaction  with the scheme as such. It broke up in the 
turbulence of theological thinking in this century when con- 
cepts of the origin of man radically altered so that the idea of 
a divine covenant with all men in Adam no longer had force. 
The doctrine of the covenants is now bypassed as an innocuous 
relic not really affecting the Confession’s system of doctrine. 
But that  the doctrine of the covenants was discredited from 
without, and never really from within the Church, has not been 
an altogether unmixed blessing. It has meant that the formal 
expression of a covenant of works was  abandoned, often to 
leave the Church unaware of a remaining legacy of implications 
running through the understanding of God, man, sin, and re- 
sponsiblity. When the broadening authority of science forbade 
the chronology and historicity of a first covenant, it did not 
touch the central motif of that covenant: law. On the contrary, 
the notion of law was amenable to scientific and philosophical 
thought. Reformed theology easily accommodated itself to this 
way of thinking by replacing the continuing historical default of 
a primal covenant by all peoples with a continuing internal de- 
fault by every man and race of a moral faw. So there has re- 
mained a sort of anonymous presence of the doctrine of the 
covenants which matches its official presence, even where the 
confessional presence was admitted to be anachronistic. It has 
had a longer reach across Reformed theology than is generally 
supposed. 
I.  The covenant of works and the covenant of  grace 
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nant  of works,  and  in Adam  the  covenant  was made  with all 
mankind.   The  Westminster Confession is terse and precise: ‘The 
first covenant made with man was a covenant of works, wherein 
life  was promised  to Adam,  and in him  to his posterity,  upon 
condition   of  perfect,   personal   obedience.’1   The  Institutes  of 
Turretin  contains  the mature  system: 
This double covenant is proposed to us in Scripture: of nature and of grace, 
of works and faith, legal and evangelical. The foundation of this distinction 
rests both on the different relation of God contracting, who can be con- 
sidered now as Creator and Lord, then as Redeemer and Father, and on 
the diverse condition of man, who may be viewed either as perfect or as a 
fallen creature; and on the diverse mode of obtaining life and happiness, 
either by proper obedience, or by another’s imputed, and on the diverse 
duties prescribed to man, to wit, works or faith. 
For in  the former, God as Creator demands perfect obedience from in- 
nocent man with the promise of eternal happiness and life; but in the latter, 
God as Father promises salvation in Christ to the fallen man, under the 
condition of faith.  The former rests upon the work of man, the latter upon 
the grace of God alone; the former upon a just  Creator, the latter upon a 
merciful Redeemer; the former was made with innocent man without a 
Mediator;  the latter with fallen man, by the intervention of a Mediator.2 
The covenant is based on divine law and justice;  it is a legal 
in  contrast  to  an evangelical  covenant.   This is a covenant  of 
works, the emphasis on works being  all the greater when  set in 
opposition  to  the  later  covenant  of  grace.   The  ‘condition’  of 
the  covenant,  man’s  duty,  according  to  Turretin,  is  not  faith, 
but works.  It is  concerned with the merit and ability of man.  A 
reward is promised  to man, if he earns it by his own good works. 
The idea for this covenant was drawn from the Mosaic law. 
Removed from its Old Testament setting, the promise of life 
on condition of obedience has been pushed back to creation 
and made the basic relationship between God and man. An  
idea which does in a limited way belong to God’s dealings with 
Israel becomes the divine order instituted at creation. Cove- 
nant theologians discuss at length the relation between the 
Mosaic covenant and the covenant of works. They find some 
differences, but the two are closely connected, at times virtually 
identical. Scriptural citations to support the covenant of works, 
as they could not be found in Genesis 1-2, are freely taken from 
the Mosaic code.  ‘If a man do these statutes, he shall live in 
them’  (Lev. 18.5). 
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The covenant of works, it is true, is set within the framework 
of a ‘condescension on God’s part’ ( Westminster Confession).1 Re- 
formed thought  usually and often carefully recognised  that 
Adam needed and received  some  ‘aid  of  grace’.2  Nor  were 
these works exclusively thought of as works of merit. Rollock 
could call them ‘pledges of thankfulness’.3 It is always recog- 
nised that any merit of man could not be  ‘intrinsic’, but would 
be on the basis of covenant, ex pacto, a term Calvin had used to 
refer only to the Mosaic covenant but which is here transferred 
to the universal covenant of works made with all in Adam. But 
federal theology could not take these influences seriously. The 
overall emphasis was that  God did not come to primal man in 
a relationship of grace, for  man  did  not  yet  need  that  grace, 
but stood by his works. All too typical  is  the  teaching  in  a 
Scots Bible class handbook: ‘By the creature’s own natural 
strength is the covenant  to be fulfilled.   Grace may have  been 
·shown in the condescension that entered into a covenant, but 
the covenant in its terms is not of grace but of works.’
4
 
This is a covenant of nature, a term which becomes (despite 
variations in Ursinus and other pre-federal writers) but an 
alternate name for the covenant of works. Again, the term is 
guarded so that this natural relationship is not intrinsic. The 
nature which God has given to man, instituted at creation, is 
described in this covenant. ‘It is called natural, not from natural 
obligation, which God has not towards man; but because it is 
founded on the nature of man, as it was first created by God, 
and on his integrity or powers’ (Turretin).5 It is connected, 
moreover, with the law of nature written on man’s heart so 
that man naturally and apart from revelation can know this 
covenant. The exact relationship between the covenant of 
works and the law of nature was variously conceived, but there 
was always a partial equation of the two. ‘It may also be re- 
cognised naturally that there is a covenant intervening be- 
tween God and man. Man’s conscience keeps asserting that to 
God the Creator and·Lord of man obedience on his part as a 
creature is bound  to be enjoined .  .. .  Man is not naturally 
1 Westminster Confession, VII,i. 2 Heppe,  op. cit., p.  246.  
3  Rollock, op. cit., I, 25. 
4 John Macpherson, The Westminster Confession of  Faith, in the Handbooks for Bible 
Classes series, ed. Marcus Dodss  and Alexander Whyte (Edinburgh, 1881), p. 66. 
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Of the various terms employed, covenant of life is the most 
promising, and unfortunately the least employed. It might have 
been used to lessen the strong emphasis on man’s works and to 
redress the balance with the covenanting grace of God. The 
‘condition of obedience’ would not have been a meritorious 
consideration but simply the sine qua non without which the gift 
could not be conferred.  But it is indicative of the mood of 
covenant theology that the term was not extensively employed. 
The Westminster Confession does not use it, though interestingly 
the Catechisms show a certain preference for it. No difference in 
emphasis is involved, however. It is ‘called a covenant of life, 
because life was promised as the reward of obedience’ (Hodge).
2
 
Man–mankind in Adam–soon broke the covenant of works. 
Sin is fundamentally a transgression of the first covenant. But 
is the covenant also broken by God, after it is broken by man? 
The federal theologians explore this question at length. Coc- 
ceius described everything to follow as a series of progressively 
greater abrogations of the first covenant. But the consensus of 
orthodoxy is that there are most important ways in which 
neither sin nor the coming of the covenant of grace abrogates 
the legal covenant. Hodge has a section in his Systematic Theo- 
logy entitled the ‘Perpetuity  of the Covenant  of Works’, and 
argues that if man could fulfil the covenant of works he could 
now be saved in this way. This conception of the covenant as 
unbroken from the side of God is the basis of the eternal 
principles of justice, instituted by God, which he still holds in 
force. God still deals with mankind in general on this basis. 
He binds all to the performance of this covenant; duty and 
responsibility are so determined ; and for this man is held ac- 
countable. Even after the establishing of the  covenant  of 
grace and for those embraced by the new covenant, the old 
covenant has force. Though saved by the evangelical covenant, 
man is ‘born under’ the legal covenant. His nature is so deter- 
mined and his need of salvation uncovered by it. 
Over against the general covenant of works there stands the 
 
1 Heidegger, op. cit., IX, 12. 
2  Westminster Shorter Catechism, question 12; Larger Catechism, questions 20 and 
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special covenant of grace, where God freely gives what he had 
before promised on condition of perfect obedience. The Con- 
fession states: 
Man by his  fall,  having  made  himself  incapable  of  life  by  that  covenant 
(of works), the Lord was pleased to make a second, commonly called the  
covenant of grace;  whereby  he  freely  offereth  to sinners life  and salvation 
by Jesus Christ, requiring of them  faith  in  him,  that  they  may  be  saved, 
and  promising  unto all those  that  are ordained  unto  life,  his  Holy  Spirit, to  
make  them  willing  and  able  to  believe.1 
This covenant  is made  too  with  Adam  and  is administered 
under  different  ‘dispensations’  which  culminate in Christ.  In   
some writers it rests on a universalistic basis, but it is character- 
istically narrowed  to include only the elect.  The covenant of 
grace is God’s way of dealing with some men, but not with all 
men.  The rest are dealt with on the basis of the covenant of 
works. 
The whole theological enterprise remains coloured by the 
primal covenant. The covenant of grace does not replace the 
covenant of works but is worked out and established within it. 
‘This covenant of grace was not so much set up in room of the 
covenant of works, as added to it.’
2
 It is a careless reading of 
federal theology to assume that the covenant of works is no 
longer important because man no longer lives in a state of 
integrity or because it has been replaced by the covenant of 
grace. The first covenant remains as the necessary pre-con- 
dition and framework of the second covenant. · Chronologically 
and logically for covenant theology grace came and comes only 
after sin. God demonstrates his grace to man only after man is 
unable to provide his own works. The important thing is that 
the whole understanding of divine grace has to be worked out 
as a second covenant introduced with the failure of the first. 
There is no real cause to speak of the grace of God until after 
man sins. Grace is a remedy and second resort, however won- 
derful that remedy may be. 
The covenant of grace, moreover, has no bearing on the 
essential nature of man. The new covenant does not alter or 
negate the nature of man’s existence, responsibility,  or  sin. 
Man may be saved by the grace of God, but he is saved be- 
cause he could  not and  cannot  save  himself.  Originally and 
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ideally man lives in a relationship to God where he by his own 
works justifies his own existence. This is paradise as it was in- 
tended  to be. 
2.  The order of grace 
Of all this Calvin knew  nothing. He is not in this technical 
sense a covenant theologian at all, for while Calvin gives pro- 
minence to the covenant of God with Abraham, fulfilled in the 
coming of Christ, the  covenant  theme  does  not  for  him  form 
the same kind of substructure as it did for the Calvinists. The 
concept of order as established by God’s grace is a fundamental 
one in Calvin. On it is carried  much  of his  thought,  and from 
this standpoint much of his theology may  best  be  understood. 
This original divine order  and  its  subsequent  inversion  by  sin 
are concepts which are parallel to the later concepts of a cove- 
nant of works and the breaking of that covenant. The will and 
purpose of God was incorporated or  instituted  into  the  uni- 
verse at creation. All things are ordered according to the move- 
ment of God’s grace in creation and purpose in  redemption. 
Calvin speaks of this ‘genuine order of nature’ early in the open- 
ing chapters of the Institutes and as well repeatedly in his Com- 
mentary on Genesis, chapters 1-8. An order of creation gives to the 
creature and particularly to man his destiny and reason for 
existence. In this order man lives in rectitude (rectitudo) or in- 
tegrity (integritas). Men ought to follow the ‘law of their creation’ 
and  live  in  the  ‘genuine  order’.1 
Existence in such order involves a twofold relation between 
God and man.  On the one side God has given and continues 
to give to man a good world. All creation is for man’s benefit 
and designed to bring him to felicity. God is to be Father to 
man. In the Commentary on Genesis, paralleled in the Institutes, 
Calvin  writes: 
In the very order of creation the paternal solicitude of God  for man is con- 
spicuous, because he has furnished the world with all things needful, and 
even with an immense profusion of wealth before he formed man. Thus 
man was rich before he was born. 
 
1 I, 3.3; II, 6.1; I, 2.1; Com. on Gen. 1-8, passim. Translations here from 
Calvin’s better known works follow for the most part the standard translations, 
e.g. the Allen edition of the Institutes and the Calvin Translation Society series of 
the com- mentaries. But I adapt these to the definitive Corpus Reformatorum text. 
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God himself has demonstrated, by the very order of creation, that he made 
all things  for the sake of man. . . .Whenever we call God the Creator of 
heaven and earth, let us at the same time reflect, that the dispensation of 
those things which he has made is in his own power, and that we are his 
children, whom he has received into his charge and custody, to be  supported 
and educated; so that we may expect every blessing from him, and cherish 
a certain hope that he will never suffer us to want those things which are 
necessary to our well-being, that our hope may depend on no other; that, 
whatever we need or desire, our prayers may be directed to him, and that, 
from whatever quarter we receive any advantage, we may acknowledge  it 
to be his benefit, and confess it with thanksgiving; that, being allured with 
such great sweetness of goodness and beneficence, we may study to love 
and worship  him with  all our hearts.1  
The theme is a recurring one, as in a passage in the Commentary 
on Psalms: 
Generally the whole order of this world is arranged and established for the 
purpose of conducing to the comfort of men . . . . But the integrity of order 
which God had established in the world  at the  beginning  is now  thrown 
into  confusion.2 
These gifts are of two kinds: natural gifts, man’s mental and 
physical faculties, the comforts of life, and ordered society, etc., 
and spiritual gifts, faith and righteousness which lead to eternal 
felicity. We are not to think of this statically. The creatures 
live by ‘continued inspiration’; creation ‘subsists only by 
a secret virtue derived from God’. This is especially true of 
man; his life is borrowed from God. ‘Communication with 
God was the source of life to Adam.’3 Man’s being is a 
dynamic exis- tence grounded in God’s continual 
communication of his own graciousness. 
The second aspect of this twofold process of life in integrity 
is man’s response. Man is to respond in fidelity to depend on 
God alone, in obedience, in belief in God’s goodness and solici- 
tude, in motion away from self and towards God, and in grati- 
tude. He faithfully, obediently, and thankfully acknowledges 
the gifts and so returns glory to God who so graciously main- 
tains his existence. 
At first man was formed in the image and resemblance of God in order that 
man might admire his Author in the adornments with which he had been 
nobly vested by God and honor him with proper gratitude. 
 
1Com. on Gen. 1.26; I, 14.22. 2Com. on Ps. 8.6. 
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The Latin gratitudo is here an interesting  change  in  Calvin’s 
own translation of the French of 1537 in the paragraph  on Man 
in the Instruction in Faith, which reads recognoissance, ‘acknow- 
ledgment’.    Man  is  co-respondent  to  God. 
If we do not begin with this point: calling upon our God, it is to pervert all 
order. So then let us learn that the principal exercise and study that the 
faithful ought to have in this world is to run to their God,  and, while acknow- 
ledging that he is the fountain of all blessings, seek good in him.1 
Here  is  Calvin’s  measured  statement  in the  Commentary  on 
Genesis, chapter 2 : 
Adam was admonished that he could claim nothing for himself as if it were 
his own, in order that he might depend wholly on the Son of God, and 
might not seek life anywhere but in him. He at the time when he possessed 
his life in safety had it only as deposited in the Word of God, and could not 
otherwise retain it than by acknowledging  that it was received from him  ...
2
 
This is clearly an order of grace. Although Calvin does not use 
just that term, he speaks often of both  the  order  and  of the 
divine grace first instituted.   The part given to man is reflexive 
of grace.   From the start Calvin transcends  the concept of order 
as primarily moral and legal and places this  under  the higher 
order of grace. What is paramount is that God is gracious and 
requires  acknowledgment   of his  grace. 
Sin disorders the divine order of grace. Calvin explains. ‘In 
the defection of the first man . . . the whole order of creation 
was everted’, a statement which illustrates a recurring theme 
in his writings. ‘The order that he instituted at the creation of 
the world is troubled when he does not deal with us as a father.’3 
We live in an inverted order of  creation. But this never means for 
Calvin that God’s purposes have altered. If it were not for 
the barrier of sin, God’s original goodness would yet be 
showered upon us. Evils arise as man inverts and shuts off the 
God given order. ‘Although we have for a time annihilated 
as much as is in us the graces of God, yet all the while he on 
his side does not wish that they should perish but he wishes 
to make them prosper’.4 
Calvin’s position on natural theology has to be understood in 
terms of this original order of grace which God maintains while 
1 Ser. on Job 22.23-30. 2  Com. on Gen. 2.9. 
3 Ser. on Job 5.17-18; Com. on Gen. 3.9. 
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man perverts.  An adequate investigation of this is outside the 
scope of this article, but what is of importance for our purposes 
is to see that though our perversity and unbelief cut off and 
disrupt both natural and spiritual gifts, God’s original gracious 
order has not been rescinded. 
God deals very bountifully with the unbelieving, but they are blind, and 
therefore he pours forth his grace without any benefit, as though he rained 
on flint or on arid rocks. However bountifully then God bestows his grace 
on the unbelieving, they yet render his favour useless, for they are like 
stones.1 
Man from his side manufactures sin out of God’s grace. God’s 
blessing a ‘through accident’ (per accidens ) turn to our harm. As 
man refuses to acknowledge in response the  gifts  of  God’s 
grace, but rather arrogates them to his own use, they are prosti- 
tuted, or transmuted  to evil.  The following passages are typical 
of   Calvin: 
God has ordered his creatures for our service, and these ought to be a help 
to guide us to him so that we should be more incited to love him because 
he shows himself a good and loving father to us, yet we take occasion at this 
to stumble. It is as though he should set up a ladder for us, or make stairs 
to come up on; and we happen to hurt ourselves by bumping against them. 
Stairs are made to help us, but if a man happens to fling himself against the 
stairs, he may happen to break his leg and hurt himself, and he shall rather 
be hindered than helped by them. So it is with us.  God wishes to draw us 
to him by his creatures, and we happen to fling ourselves against them 
rashly and as it were in spite.2 
In all things and by every means he causes us now to taste his fatherly 
love with the intent that we might be confirmed in that which he declares 
to us in the gospel, to know that he has reserved a better heritage for us, 
as for children whom he has adopted.  All the creatures then ought to point 
us heavenward.  Yet in fact we put everything in reverse, because we apply 
the creatures of God to our own lust in such a way that we are held down 
here below.  In short, as many helps as God has given us to draw us to 
himself, these are to us so many hindrances to hold us back in this world.3 
Redemption reveals that God has always willed to be gra- 
cious, still so wills, and is not finally going to let sin stand in 
his way. When God can no longer give life to man in nature, 
he does not break the order but reaffirms it in a new way as 
he enters history in his redemptive covenant. ‘As the whole 
world gained nothing in instruction from the fact that God had 
1 Com. on Zech. 12.10. 
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exhibited his wisdom in the creatures, he then resorted to an- 
other method for instructing man’ .
1
 ‘Whereas the Lord 
invites 
us to himself by means of the creatures with no effect . . . he 
has added, as was necessary, a new remedy or rather a new aid 
to assist our inept capacity.’2 It is important to see that when 
God’s particular relevation in Israel and in Christ comes, this 
is a reaffirming of God’s original order, and not– as later 
Re- formed dogmatics interpreted it–the establishment of 
new and different kind of order. 
Though Calvin speaks extensively of the ‘special grace’ in- 
volved in redemption, which has to be contrasted with a first, 
general grace, and though man immutably established in the 
new creation is more blessed than he was in the first mutable 
paradise, the second creation is always essentially the same kind 
of order: the flowing  out of God’s grace to grateful  man. 
Parallel  to the two ‘orders’ or covenants–works and grace–  
in covenant theology, there is for Calvin but one order, order 
inverted, and order re-established. This involves a ‘new aid’ or 
‘another method’ yet it is certainly not a new and contrasting 
order, but God’s new way to establish and complete what He 
first instituted at creation. There is not the slightest suggestion 
in Calvin that God’s grace appears in covenant with Abraham 
fulfilled in Christ so as to contrast with and negate His earlier 
non-gracious or semi-gracious ways, that grace is then first· 
showered upon a world previously and generally the realm of 
law. Calvin’s covenant of grace is in reflection of and in resto- 
ration of, not in contrast with, the original order. Calvin uses 
rarely the term ‘covenant of life’ but this must not be confused 
with the ‘covenant of life’ of federal thought.3   For him the 
covenant of life is synonymous with the one, gracious, redemp-. 
tive covenant of God. 
It would be misleading to maintain· that Calvin has no 
thought of law in  his concept of the original relation between 
God and man. On the contrary, law has a vital place in God’s 
ordering of his world; order can be maintained only as man is 
obedient to divine law. But it would be inaccurate to set forth 
Calvin’s concept principally along these lines. The principal 
thing in the primal order, the principle of it, is God’s grace. 
1 Ser. on Isa. 53.1-4. 2 Argument to the Com. on Gen. 
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It would be similarly inaccurate to maintain that covenant 
theology has no thought of grace in its concept of the primal 
legal covenant. Cocceius speaks of the ‘spiritual grace given 
him (Adam) at creation.’1 When thinking carefully  at  this 
point, Calvinism has always remembered to say that grace was 
needed by Adam. Such a statement is dutifully included al- 
most as if covenant theologians were uneasy about the legal 
covenant.  A. A. Hodge makes this promising statement: 
This [legal] covenant was also in its essence a covenant of grace, in that it 
graciously promised life in the society of God as the freely-granted reward 
of an obedience already unconditionally due.  Nevertheless it was a covenant 
of works and of law with respect to its demands and conditions.2 
In this respect the treatment of R. L. Dabney is among the 
most satisfying; he speaks somewhat antithetically of a 
‘gracious covenant of works.’
3
 
But it is of serious consequence that such careful disclaimers 
and apologies have to be made. Having reserved theoretically 
sufficient place for God to be gracious and erected supposedly 
adequate safeguards, covenant theology always in fact re- 
turned by way of a ‘nevertheless’ (Hodge) to expound and 
operate with the legal demands of this half-gracious God of the 
first covenant. Very soon the principle of it is no longer grace, 
but law. This succinct statement closes Fisher’s chapter on the 
covenant of works: 
The law was Adam’s lease when God made him tenant of Eden; the con- 
ditions of which bond when he kept not, he forfeited himself and all for us. 
God read a lecture of the law to him before he fell, to be a hedge to keep 
him in paradise; but when Adam would not keep within compass, this law 
is now become as the flaming sword at Eden’s gate, to keep him and his 
posterity out.’ 
Therefore  at a vital point  Calvin  and  covenant  theology  are 
not just different; they are as opposed as grace and law.  With 
the twin covenants, there has now crept into Reformed theology 
a concept of the primal relationship between God and man, and 
a corresponding statement of the ability and merit of man that 
is not only absent from Calvin, it is alien to his thought.  The 
1  Cocceius, op. cit.,  III, 63. 
2 A. A. Hodge, A Commentary on the Confession of  Faith (Philadelphia, 1869 and 
1923), p. 170. 
3 R. L. Dabney, Systematic and Polemic  Theology (Richmond, 1927), p. 302. 
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double covenant fabric not only modifies; it reverses much of 
Calvin’s thought about man’s primal relation  to his God. 
3. Duty 
In Calvin what man is to do is reflexive of grace, but soon 
in Calvinism what man is to do becomes reflexive of law. There 
are extremely important differences in these two conceptions of 
the duty of man, differences which affect the whole course of 
theology, and–here is the insidious legacy–differences which 
tend to remain even when formal adherence to the covenant of 
works becomes archaic. 
Calvin’s outworking of man’s duty is essentially  in  terms  of 
four  elements:  faith,  obedience,  love,  and  gratitude.   Though 
he is not particularly systematic  in  listing  these  elements, 
similar expositions do recur  with  interesting  regularity.  We 
may take as typical one of the opening questions of the Geneva 
Catechism of 1541 : 
Q. What is the way to honour God aright? 
A. To honour God aright is to put our whole trust in him, to study to 
serve him in obeying his will, to invoke him in all our necessities, seeking 
our salvation and all good things at his hand, and finally to acknowledge 
both with heart and mouth that he is the lively fountain of all goodness.1 
Adam was to live by ‘faith’.
2
 And the trees in the garden were 
calculated to develop faith. Presumably the faith of man in 
integrity would have been somewhat different; but in Calvin’s 
description of Adam’s obligation to his God all these elements 
are conspicuously present: trust in the goodness of God, a de- 
pending wholly upon the word of God (or Son of God), 
obedience, and gratitude. In short, Adam no less than re- 
deemed man had more to let God do for him than to do for 
God; as he lived so, he was a man of faith. The duty of primal 
man and of man generically is not different in essence from 
that of the elect in the Church. 
If the question is raised, of course, Calvin does not hesitate 
to teach that Adam was given a law. In his Commentary on 
Genesis, he defends this point against the contention that there 
was no law for Adam. Calvin is no  antinomian  regarding 
man’s duty in integrity; neither is he a legalist. Adam’s duty 
was to a divine law, even though in expounding Genesis Calvin 
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prefers, as he states, to speak of the ordering of life according 
to· the will of God.
1
 It is obedience to the law, but not of the 
law; It is an obedience of faith. It flows from faith, is born of 
love and gratitude, and keeps the law in praise of a beneficient 
and  paternal  God. 
But this is not a meritorious obedience. The commandment 
to partake of the tree of life does not mean that life is achieved 
through its proper use. ‘He gave the tree of life its name, not 
because it could confer on man that life with which he had been 
previously endued, but in order that it might be a symbol and 
memorial of the life which he had received from God.
2
 Calvin 
thought of this obedience in a certain sense as a condition of 
man’s continuing to receive grace. The commandment re- 
specting the tree of knowledge of good and evil is a ‘test of 
obedience’. Life is given only as, but not because, man obeys. 
Calvin  explains: 
The promise which authorised him to expect eternal life, as long as he should 
eat of the tree of life, and, on the other hand, the dreadful denunciation of 
death, as soon as he should taste of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, 
were calculated for the probation and exercise of faith.3 
The authorised expectation of life for eating from the one tree, 
or the judgment  of death for eating from the other, could be 
      isolated as an incipient covenant of works. But the full state- 
ment makes it clear that life was not conditional upon obedience 
in any meritorious way. The tree of life was a figure of Christ 
to come, a sacrament to lead man to ‘the knowledge of divine 
grace’, so designed … 
. . . that man, as often as he tasted of the fruit of that tree, should remember 
whence he received his life, in order that he might acknowledge that he 
lives not by his own power, but by the kindness of God alone; and that life 
is not (as they commonly speak) an intrinsic good, but proceeds from God.4 
It subsequently becomes apparent that the slightest hint to the 
contrary, permitting man in some part to earn his salvation, is 
resisted by Calvin as the beginning of degeneration into sin. 
The Westminster Shorter Catechism begins in the spirit of Calvin 
(if not actually borrowing from him) with a memorable answer 
to its opening question: 
 
1 Com. on Gm. 2.16; cf. on Gen. 2.9. 
                                                                  3 II, 1-4. 
 
 2  Com. on Gen. 2.9. 
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Q. What is the chief end of man? 
A. Man’s chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever. 
Such a beginning promises a close following of Calvin in answer 
to the question about the duty of man. But instead the West- 
minster divines made normative for all subsequent Presby- 
terians a concept of duty radically different from that which 
Calvin had given the Reformed Church. A little later in the 
Catechism the task assigned man is stated another way: 
When God had created man, he entered into a covenant of life with him, 
upon condition of perfect obedience; forbidding him to eat of the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil, upon pain of death.1 
The shifting mood is yet too subtle for the catechumen  to 
catch, for had not Calvin said that Adam was placed in Eden 
‘on this condition, that he should continue in obedience  to 
God’? 
The radical difference is soon apparent, however. Compare 
Calvin’s statement, cited earlier, from the Instruction in Faith: 
At first man was formed in the image and resemblance of God in order that 
man might admire his Author in the adornments with which he had been 
nobly vested by God  and honour him with proper gratitude. 
with the calculated and formal assertion of the Westminster 
Confession: 
God gave to Adam a law, as a covenant of works, by which he bound him 
and all his posterity to personal, entire, exact and perpetual obedience; 
promised life upon the fulfilling, and threatened death upon the breach of 
it; and endued him with power and ability to keep it.2 
Faith is the subsequent duty of the elect; but works is man’s 
universal duty. The covenant of works and the covenant of 
grace differ in ‘the diverse duties prescribed to man, to wit, 
works or faith’ (Turretin). If faith is preserved nominally also 
as Adam’s duty it is re-interpreted as a work. Turretin deals 
with this at length: 
 In the first covenant faith was required as a work and a part of the inherent 
righteousness to which life was promised. But in the second it is demanded, 
not as a work on account of which life is given, but as a mere instrument 
apprehending the righteousness of Christ.. . . In the one, faith was a 
theological virtue from the strength of nature, terminating on God, the 
1 Westminster Shorter Catechism, question 12. 
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Creator; in the other faith is an evangelical condition, after the manner of 
supernatural grace, terminating on God, the Redeemer. 
The first [covenant] gave matter for glorying to man when he observed it 
but the second excludes all glorying of man because founded upon the grace 
of God alone. 1 
 
Far from being a faithfulness to depend on God alone, as in 
Calvin, this faith is an index of man’s strength, a meritorious 
theological  virtue. 
It is not difficult to find in the federal writers eloquent dis- 
cussions of how innocent man was to delight in God’s law and 
goodness, though mention of the grace or heneficence of God 
is typically absent at this stage. Supposedly there is a certain 
high happiness  in this legal obedience. But all this becomes 
peculiarly unsatisfying when we are told that this enjoying of 
God to which the Shorter Catechism refers is a formal, contractual 
duty of works. At once there is a twofold shift. First, there is 
little thought of God’s goodness as putting man under obli- 
gation; duty is now defined in terms of law, because duty is 
derived  from  law: 
Q. What is the duty which God requireth of man ? 
A. The duty which God requireth  of man  is  obedience  to his revealed 
will. . . . The moral  law is the declaration of the  will of God  to mankind, 
directing and binding everyone to personal, perfect, and perpetual con- 
formity and obedience thereunto . . . .2  ( Larger Catechism) 
 
Secondly, duty shifts to focus on man’s initiative. The man 
who was in Calvin’s thought to seek and receive all good from 
the hand of God, and thankfully to acknowledge it, has now to 
do for himself. The burden of achieving life is laid squarely 
on his own shoulders. 
Such a perfect observance of the laws of the covenant . ..had given man 
a right to the reward . . . .  He could say, I have fulfilled the conditions of 
the covenant, I have constantly and perfectly done what was commanded; 
now I claim and expect that thou, 0 my God, wilt grant me the promised 
happiness. 3 ( Witsius) 
 
Such duty of man, remember, is not merely given Adam. In 
him it is given us all.  It is a duty each is born under. 
1 Turretin, op. cit., XII, iv, 7 and 12; VIII, iii, 4. 
2 Westminster Larger  Catechism, questions 91 and 93. 
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According to Calvin, in sin man dis-graces himself. The 
order of dependence on divine goodness is dis-ordered as man 
turns to depend on himself. In this, man is a sinner not only 
as he is immoral or fails to conform to law. Rather he takes 
the rectitude with which he was blessed and ascribes it to him- 
self, thereby making it a curse. By contrast, Reformed tradi- 
tion since, having put little emphasis on the grace of God to 
man at creation, has not understood sin as having this character. 
Instead, it was too often restricted to an exposition of sin in 
legal and moral terms, in correspondence to the legal covenant 
which God had at first instituted. Calvin and the Calvinists, 
despite superficial similarities, have fundamentally different 
ways of describing the fundamental sin. 
Calvin analyses the sin of Adam from four basic viewpoints, 
in each case recognising that man  has done precisely the oppo- 
site of his duty. Calvin’s most specific answer to  the  inquiry 
about the root  defection  is infidelity  or faithlessness (infidelitas). 
He writes in the Commentary on Genesis, paralleled in the Institutes, 
‘infidelity was the root of the defection, just as faith alone unites 
us to God’.
1
 In the paragraph  on  Man in  the Instruction  in Faith 
duty and sin are clear opposites. Man  was  formed  to  honour 
God with proper gratitude. ‘But, having trusted such a great 
excellence of his nature and having forgotten from whom it had 
come and by  whom  it  subsisted,  man  strove  to  raise  himself 
up apart from the Lord.’ A closely related category is that of 
unbelief ( incredulitas): 
‘This is the source of all evils: that we are not fully convinced that in God 
is everything that can be desired for our salvation.’ ‘All evils arise from 
unbelief and distrust.’ 2 (Commentary on Isaiah) 
From this rises disobedience, which is for Calvin a second 
way of stating the root sin. ‘It is evident that the fall 
commenced in disobedience.’
3
 This disobedience, upon 
analysis, is driven 
by man’s concupiscence, which Calvin finds a further category 
of primal sin. ‘Concupiscence . . . (is not) just any kind of 





1 Com. on Gen. 3.6; II, 1.4 
2 Com. on Isa. 10.21 and on Isa. 57.13. 
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Paul finds it to be the source of his sin in the struggle recounted 
in Romans 7.  Contemporary use of the term self-will reflects 
best what Calvin has in mind here. It is the opposite of loving 
God, the άταξία or disorder which enters when man does not 
depend on the goodness of God. Paul had formally and sin- 
cerely kept the law, so he thought at least. Yet he was the con- 
cupiscent chief of sinners because of all men he most believed 
himself to have  attained his own eternal life. Paul’s  trouble 
was that ‘being puffed up with confidence in his own righteous- 
ness, he expected salvation by his works’.
1
 Of all man’s desires, 
the original and worst is ‘this cupiditas to desire to have some- 
thing of our own which may reside in ourselves rather than in 
God’.2 
A final, most basic way of describing the primal sin is in 
terms of ingratitude. When God had enriched Adam with 
bounteous gifts, he lost all through ingratitude. This theme 
underlies the opening paragraph of a significant chapter in the 
Institutes, II, 2, and it is developed in several sermons, notably 
on  Deuteronomy  and  on Job: 
God was not niggardly in his blessings, but poured them out bountifully, 
just as he who is the fountain of all liberality. He showed himself more than 
liberal toward mankind in the person of Adam. But we lost those blessings, 
God had to curtail his blessings which he had given us, because Adam 
through his ingratitude became corrupted.3 
Adam could not abide all that, and by his ingratitude he alienated him- 
self from God.4 
This theme is found in Paul’s opening chapters in Romans. 
Though all have not had the felicity of Adam, yet all have had 
or ignored blessings in abundance, and from this their sin 
arises. ‘The nature of man contains the seed of all evils . . . 
Thus Paul in Romans I lists many different kinds of vices and 
crimes which arise out of the ignorance of God and that in- 
gratitude of which he had shown all unbelievers to be guilty’.5 
In each of these ways of thinking about the primal s i n – i n -  
fidelity, disobedience, concupiscence and self-will, and in- 
gratitude–Calvin keeps in constant focus the breaking of the 
original relationship of grace. Sin has to be set opposite the 
love of God as man’s refusal to be loved by God and his desire 
to love himself.      
1 Com. on Exod. 20.17. 
4 Ser. on Dmt. 28.46-50. 
2  II, 2. 10. 3  Ser. on Job 3.2-10. 











R ESPONSIBLE MAN                          149 
When one lays aside Calvin to search the Calvinists for the 
nature of sin, he comes into a very much smaller world. The 
simple, almost exclusive definition is that sin is breaking the 
law. Covenant theology can rise no further than the classic 
answer of the Westminster Shorter Catechism: ‘Sin is any want of 
conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God’.
1
 This 
definition represents the settled consensus of orthodoxy, never 
subsequently much to change. One wonders that the covenant. 
theologians could speak at all of a ‘fall from grace’, for there 
is little concept of any fall from any grace in their analysis of 
sin. Exclusively now it is a development of the breaking of the 
covenant of works. Adam’s sin is in essence a legal trans- 
gression. 
This act of his was a wilful transgression of a law, under the precepts whereof 
he was most justly created; and under the malediction whereof he was 
necessarily and righteously subject. . . .Though at first glance it seems to 
be a small offence, yet, if we look more wistfully upon the matter it will 
appear to be an exceeding great offense. . . . Nay, how could there a greater 
sin committed than that, when Adam, at that one clap, broke all ten com- 
mandments?3  (Fisher) 
Many writers prove that Adam  broke both  tables of the law; 
some demonstrate how he broke each of the ten commandments.  . 
The locus classicus in Scripture is John 3.4: ‘Sin is lawless- 
ness’. The Greek word  which appears here is ά ν ο μ ί α , a 
combi- 
 nation of a (without) and νόμος (law). In his commentary here 
Calvin had  noticed,  somewhat  incidentally, John’s  ‘defining  sin 
as the transgression of the law’, though it is significant that 
reference to I John 3.4 does not occur in the Institutes. Now 
lawlessness  becomes  the  definitive  concept.  The  word ά ν ο μ ί α  
is taken over intact, often untranslated, and employed  in  vir- 
tually  every  federal  definition  of sin. 
Its [sin’s] nature is clearly shown by the apostle, when he says, ‘Sin is 
the transgression of the law.’ . . . The essence of sin therefore consists in a 
con- trariety to the divine law, and it is therefore the absence of that 
rectitude, which ought to be in a rational creature according to the 
requirement of that law. Hence in order to ascertain whether any thing is 
sinful, we must examine whether it is contrary to the law; for nothing else 
is required. 3 
1 Westminster Shorter Catechism, question 14; cf. Confession, VI, vi. 
2 Fisher, op. cit. (Part 1), I, 2-3. 
3 Benedict Pictet, Theologica Christiana (Geneva 1696), IV, iii. Pictet was pro- 
fessor of theology at Geneva after Turretin, his uncle. Pictet’s Christian Theology 
was reprinted in English in Philadelphia in 1845. 
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Wider categories, such as those Calvin had used, may still 
be present, though they are conspicuously absent from many 
writers. Turretin’s  answer to the question  about the first sin 
of man is, in a superficial way, much like Calvin’s. Adam’s 
sin was an aggregate of many. Turretin makes a place  for 
pride, disobedience, concupiscence, unbelief, distrust, and even 
–which is rare in the covenant theologians–ingratitude. But 
everything now falls under the shadow of the covenant of works. 
Most fundamentally, Adam broke the law, both tables of it. 
For all the similarities to Calvin, there is in Turretin a pro- 
nounced emphasis on law foreign to Calvin’s thought. 
It is certain that we must not regard that fall as any particular sin, such as 
theft, or adultery, but as a general apostasy and defection from God, a 
violation not only of the special positive law about the not eating the for- 
bidden fruit, but also of the whole moral law, included in it, and so also of 
the obedience, which man owed to God, his Creator, especially by reason 
of the covenant entered into with him; so that here is, as it were, a compli- 
cated disease, and a total aggregate of various acts, both internal and ex- 
ternal, impinging against both tables of the  law.1  
The most radical consequence of the now legalised doctrine 
of sin is that covenant theology does not, for indeed it cannot, 
describe sin in what is for Calvin the most basic way of all: 
man’s faithless rejection of the goodness of God in favour of 
his own self-willed efforts to seek his own happiness elsewhere. 
Here Calvin and the Calvinists come at length to a parting of 
the ways. When Calvin describes sin as that faithlessness which 
cuts off God’s grace, he has  gone where covenant theology 
could not follow. It could only go further along its own way 
of describing sin as lawlessness, because, with the intervention 
of the covenant of works, it knows nothing about man’s first 
duty as that of faithfulness to depend on the divine goodness. 
And before the end of the way is reached, these paths of Calvin 
and his followers are not simply parted; they are opposed. 
Repeatedly, and at significant points in his writings, where 
Calvin is putting the whole thing in perspective  (Institutes, II, 
2. 1; Commentary on Genesis, chapter 2; Instruction in Faith), we 
have heard Calvin warn against ‘this cupidity to desire to have 
something of our own which may reside in ourselves rather 
than in God’, this failure of man to be grateful for grace and 
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this seeking of man ‘to raise himself up apart from the 
Lord’. For man this desire for recognition, for something in 
which to boast, is the beginning of the end. 
The coming of the covenant of works permits what Calvin 
forbids. It prescribes for man just what Calvin proscribes: the 
attempt to rely on something of man’s own and not to seek life 
as a gift at the hand of God. The very thing which we have 
heard Calvin say in his exposition of Genesis 2 that Adam is 
told he cannot do— 
Adam was admonished that he could claim nothing for himself as if it were 
his own, in order that he might depend wholly on the Son of God, and 
might not seek life anywhere but in him . . . . He at the time when he pos- 
sessed his life in safety had it only as deposited in the Word of God, and 
could not otherwise retain it than by acknowledging that it was received 
from him— 
is the very thing that covenant theology now encourages man 
to do. Witsius explains that under the general, universal cove- 
nant a place is allotted and permitted for man to have a ‘boast- 
ing’ and ‘glorying’ of his own. 
In the covenant of works, man is considered as working, and the reward 
to be given as of debt; and therefore, man’s glorying is not excluded, but 
he may glory, as a faithful servant may do, upon the right discharge of his 
duty, and may claim the reward promised to his working. 1 
Here, at the end of the way, federal theology is walking a path 
alien to Calvin. It does not know that in the very positing of 
such a boasting for man sin is latent ; indeed here is the chief 
sin of man. 
5. Responsibility 
The word responsibility does not occur in Calvin’s writings, 
nor in the earlier covenant writers. There was no corresponding 
word in the Latin or French of Calvin’s time, and responsible in 
its modern usage has developed since. But Calvin has parallel 
language: that of obligation, duty, accountability,  and  cul- 
pability. The lines along which his concept of obligation is 
developed, in contrast to the federal  writers,  may  be judged 
from what we have already said about duty. Similarly with 
culpability, both for Calvin and the  Calvinists  the  concept 
develops  from   the   understanding   of  sin.    That   development, 
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though, is more complex than we can trace here, particularly 
with regard to the natural man. Our thesis here, however, can 
be profitably brought to focus with a look in closing at the 
contrasting concepts of accountability in the two schools of 
thought. Calvin uses the adjective accountable, in French, con- 
table or comptable, though apparently not the noun accountability. 
Involved here is a notion of the account man is to render and of 
the ability he has so to do. 
Calvin thinks of man as accountable only under the govern- 
ing principle of God’s grace. Man does not present an account 
of his accomplishments and look for felicity on grounds of the 
profit, fruition, or increase of his talents. He does not achieve 
but receives felicity, and he receives it by proper acknowledg- 
ment. Only in this secondary sense of retaining or receiving 
life can we say that men are accountable. Initially man is not put 
on his own account. But the federal writers posit for man ac- 
countability in·a primary sense. Is not this the kind of accoun- 
tability the Westminster Confession asks of a race of men who at 
the start are established in ‘a covenant of works, wherein life 
was promised to Adam, and in him to his posterity, upon con- 
dition of perfect and personal obedience’, and who at the end, 
with this covenant in many ways valid still, are called ‘to give 
an account of their thoughts, words, and deeds . . . to receive 
according to what they have done in the body’.
1
 This is the 
only accountability possible in a covenant in which, according 
to Turretin, life ‘rests upon the work of man’.2 
Had these two paragraphs from Calvin’s Sermons on Ephesians 
and Sermons on Job been heeded by second and third generation 
Calvinists, there never would have been a covenant of works, 
with its novel notion of man’s accountability, and the course of 
Reformed theology would have been far more faithful to the 
mind of Calvin : 
Let us put the case that we were in the integrity in which our father Adam 
was at the first. Should we then presume it was of ourselves under the 
illusion that God had ennobled us in this way? Now we hold everything 
from him . . . . Would we have it through our own dexterity ? Would we 
have got it by our own strength ? [vertu ꞊ power] No! But we would have 
it because God had given it to us through his own free goodness.3 
1 Westminster Confession, VII, ii,  and XXXV, i. 
2 Turretin, op. cit., VIII, iii,4. 
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Let us recognise then that the praise is due to him that we may not de- 
fraud him of that which belongs to him. For if we should live as perfectly 
as angels and yet have the foolish idea that this came from our own free 
will and of our own movement, then we would miss the principal thing. 
To what end serve all our good works lest it be that God in them is glorified? 
But if we think ourselves the author of them, we see that they are corrupted 
in so doing, and are converted into vices, so that they are nothing more than 
ambition.1 
 
Far  from  being  God’s  original  plan  for  man,  this  notion  of 
a man able to render account for himself is that which natural 
man assumes in sin. The sin of man is ever his thinking himself 
able to do this and that with his own wisdom, free will, and 
virtue.  The pagan faiths  acknowledge  a  Creator  God,  ‘but 
they said that attaining to  heaven  was  the  ability  of  man. . . . 
We can co-operate, so they say, so that when it comes to the 




The part that is given to man, according to Calvin, is a de- 
pendent, subordinate accountability. Man is called to account 
for his acknowledging or not acknowledging the blessing of God. 
On this basis he forfeits or retains life. From literally hundreds 
of passages that well illustrate Calvin’s thought here, the follow- 
ing must suffice as typical: 
Our Lord calls us gently to him, he wishes to win us by such kindness, and 
therefore if we do not deign to come to him  that which  we receive at his 
hand will cost us right dearly.  It is true that God asks no payment  from us, 
for we can bring him  nothing.   But yet  as our duty he would have us render 
an expression of thanksgiving  to  him.  If  we  do  not  do this,  the  sacrilege 
must be laid to Our charge that we have  ravaged  the  blessing  of God, for 
being in no way his children.  For  what  right  do we  have  to enjoy  them 
unless it is that he is our father?  . . .   What remains  but  that our Lord enter 
into account [entrer en conte] with us, if we on our part do not desire to serve 
him, and if the ease and rest which he has given us is not applied to the end 
that  we truly  show  that  we hold  him  for  our  father,  inasmuch  as he treats 
us as his children.  If, I say, we  do not  acknowledge  this,  then  our  ingrati- 
 tude will not go unpunished. 3  (Sermons on Deuteronomy ) 
Etymologically, ability is part of the word accountability, and 
an understanding of man’s ability is part of a concept of ac- 
countability.  Calvin writes, sometimes at length about human 
1  Ser. on Eph. 1.4-6. 
2 Ser. on Eph. 1.17-18. 
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ability. His terms are those of faculty (faculté, facultas ) and 
virtue or strength ( virtus, vertu), and closely related is the whole 
argument about the will ( voluntas, etc.) of man. But because he 
sees all ability as a gracious gift from God, he is inclined, 
especially when not drawn into controversy, to speak more of 
man’s gifts than of his abilities. 
When pressed by critics in  argument, Calvin is willing to 
grant that man in integrity had a ‘faculty of choosing’ or ‘the 
power of his own determination’, an ability which he does not 
now have.  ‘In this integrity man was endued  with free will, 
by which, if he had chosen, he might have obtained eternal 
life’. But Calvin is always uncomfortable with such concessions, 
lest the conclusion follow that this primitive endowment was 
such that should man have chosen the good he would have 
cause for self-congratulation. He is never content to terminate 
such argument without a warning to the critics lest they ‘design 
to teach man to seek within himself a power (facultas) to attain 
salvation’.
1
 Any ‘faculty of choosing’ is not a power in 
himself but a power from God, a power in grace. 
But what is understood when  the Westminster Confession 
teaches for Calvinism a century later that ‘Man, in his state of 
innocency, had freedom and power to will and to do that which 
is good and well-pleasing to God’? What must we conclude 
about the kind of ability Adam once had when the Confession 
proceeds to the statement that man has ‘lost all ability of will 
to any spiritual good accompanying salvation’, and ‘is not able 
by his own strength’ to work good works? He once was so able; 
under the first covenant the Confession posits for man ‘power 
and ability to keep it’.
2
 With due allowance for the reservation 
and recognition that man is not intrinsically independent of his 
God, but has a God-given endowment or deposit of powers, 
covenant theology knows a point where man, ideally at least, 
needs no further grace beyond this minimum or habitual en- 
dowment, but is to proceed alone on his own strength of will 
to a higher good. In the words of the Confession the man and 
the woman are ‘left to the liberty of their own will’.
3
 This must 
be so, because in some sense man and not God must be the 
responsible  author of good works.   We cannot avoid the con- 
1  II, 5.18. 
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clusion that, should this man whom God has ‘left’ to the 
liberty of his own will succeed with these powers on deposit, he 
primarily and not the God who left him so, is the responsible 
one. If  the God who once left him to the exercise of his own 
abilities re- turns at length to establish  a covenant  of grace  
additionally to the covenant of works, this does not alter the 
fundamental conception of what it means to be a responsible 
man. 
When the literalism of the first covenant was refined away, 
under the pressure of criticism in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, this concept of a responsible man tended nonetheless 
to remain. Man finds himself with a . deposit of abilities and 
under divine law; these determine  his self-understanding and 
his responsibilities, The historical covenant is  replaced by 
timeless divine-natural truths. The man who is now infected 
with sin cannot save himself, but this in no way affects the ideal 
(if no longer primal or original) concept of responsibility. Con- 
sider for instance how subtly the long shadow of the covenant 
of works reaches across the doctrine of man in the brief state- 
ment of faith which served the Presbyterian Church, U.S. from 
1913 to  1962 : 
He made man in his own image; male and female created he them, with 
immortal souls, endowed with knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, 
having the law of God in their hearts and power to fulfill it, and yet under 
a possibility of transgression, being left to the freedom of their own will. 1 
And it is a deeply rooted persuasion that one of the ‘particular 
accents’ of the Reformed witness is the responsibility of man 
under law. A recent statement is revealing, redeemed only by 
the caution which links obedience with gratitude in the closing 
sentence: 
In a world which is confused as to manner of life and which has lost a com- 
pelling sense of responsibility, we affirm our faith that God’s will for human 
life has been made known in his law. The validity of that law has in no 
way been abrogated by the Gospel. This law which is written into the 
structure of creation has been clearly revealed in the law of the Old Testa- 
ment and supremely in the law of Christ. We affirm that the meaning  of 
life is to be found when men, in thanksgiving for God’s mercy and forgiveness, 
daily increase in obedience to His revealed will.2 
1  ‘A Brief Statement of Belief’, for years printed and bound with the Presby- 
terian Church, U.S., edition of the Westminster Confession. 
2   ‘The Witness of the Reformed Churches’, a paper presented to the 1964 
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, U.S., in conversations concerning 
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To  the  extent  to  which  man  is  responsible  on  the  basis  of  a 
divine  law  written  into creation  and  which  has  a certain  per- 
manence  and  priority  over  the  Gospel,  we  maintain  that  this 
witness is yet  accented  more  by  the  Calvinists  than by Calvin. 
Perhaps  it is only  now,  as evidenced  by  recent  confessional 
changes  in  the   United   Presbyterian   Church,   that   Reformed 
theology  is  prepared   to  reverse  the  federal  order  of  law  and 
grace  and  to  return  to  Calvin’s grace  and  law.   With. that  re- 
turn, the  law-keeping  man  of the  Westminster Confession can 
again  become  the  grace-receiving  man  of  the  Reformer  him- 
self.   If God insists on answerability  to his law, as Calvin main- 
tains  not  less  than  the  Calvinists,  man  does  not  discover  in 
such morality  his fullest  responsibility.   We know  ourselves  as 
responsible  men  only  when  we  encounter  a  God  of  love  and 
become answerable to his grace.   Responsibility  is not  an obli- 
gation, but  an invitation; not a task, but  a gift; not a command 
to  work  and  choose,  but  a call  to  love  and  be  loved ; not  so 
much God’s precept as His promise. 
The danger that has beset Reformed thought throughout its 
venture into covenant theology is that in its use of covenant, 
nature, law, and grace, it makes of the Christian faith some- 
thing which comes in where human powers fail. Religion be- 
comes synonymous with redemption, and man needs God only 
for the mending of life’s wrongness, to rescue him from his 
irresponsibility. The authentic Reformed witness makes place 
for this, but goes beyond. Religion belongs not to the weakness 
of life, but to its strength. Man must have faith not just because 
he is a sinner, but because he is human. Man’s fundamental 
need for communion  with a gracious God springs not merely 
from his redemption, but more basically from his dignity as a 
creature formed for grace. Grace belongs before sin, not less 
than after.  In grace God made and makes a responsible man. 
